eMudhra intermediate CA compromise
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Private keys of eight eMudhra intermediate CA certificates were compromised, allowing website impersonation.
Wayne demonstrated the compromise by signing a message with the private keys of eight eMudhra intermediate CAs. The keys were incorrectly generated, allowing anyone to recover them from the certificates since April 2025. Mozilla, Apple, Microsoft, and Chrome have blocked the intermediates via OneCRL, CRLite, and CRLSets. eMudhra revoked the certificates, but many clients outside browsers require software updates. Patches are available for ca-certificates packages (Ubuntu, Debian, Arch, Fedora), NSS, Go, Node.js, Python certifi, Rust webpki-roots, Electron, and others.
What commenters are saying
Commenters criticized Web PKI for allowing any CA to vouch for any domain, calling for alternatives like DANE or name constraints. Some argued DANE aligns trust with the DNS hierarchy but noted it lacks transparency logs and depends on US-rooted DNS servers. Others defended the current system, saying browser vendors handle revocation swiftly and users prefer delegated trust. A web-of-trust was dismissed as ineffective, reverting to central authorities. Pro-tips: upgrade Go to 1.27.3, rustls-webpki to 0.103.16, Python certifi to 2026.10.19, and Electron to 44.9.1.